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CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATIONS OF
INCARCERATED PARENTS
Karen Rothschild Cavanaugh and Daniel Pollackt

INTRODUCTION
The [Clinton] Administration estimates that the potential
amount of child support obligations that could be collected yearly is $47 billion annually (if every custodial
mother had a child support order(s), support payments
averaged $5400 per year, and the full amount were
paid). However, only $20 billion in child support obligations have actually been legally established, and in FY
1993 only $13 billion was paid. Thus, the gap between
estimated potential child support payments and actual
payments was $34 billion annually. The Administration
attributes this gap to the lack of a legally established
support order, the low amount of existing awards, and
the failure of States to collect child support in a majority
of cases.1
Non-collection of child support is a multifaceted social and economic problem that disproportionately affects women-especially poor
women. In its most recent report (1995), the United States Census Bureau identified some baseline information for 1991, finding that 11.5 mil2
lion parents have custody of children less than twenty-one years of age.
Of these parents, 9.9 million (86%) are mothers, and 1.6 million (14%)
are fathers.3 Of women entitled to support orders, only 39 percent of
mothers below the poverty line have support orders compared to 56 percent of women generally. 4 In addition to the lack of support orders, poor
enforcement and the unsuccessful collection of payments are also serious
t Karen Rothschild Cavanaugh, J.D., is an attorney in New York City. Daniel Pollack,
M.S.W., J.D., is Associate Professor at Wurzweiler School of Social Work, and Adjunct Pro-

fessor at Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University.
1 Child Support: Changes Enacted or Proposed in the 103rd Congress, Cong. Res.
Serv. Rep. (EP)V No. 95-142, at 3 (Jan. 9, 1995).
2 BUREAU OF THE CENsus, U.S. DEP'T OF COMmRCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS,
StoRms No. P60-187, CHLD SUPPORT FOR CUSTODIAL MOTMRS AND FATHERS: 1991, at 1

(1995).
3 See id.
4 See id. at 7.
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problems. Fifty-two percent of women who had a child support award
received full payment, 24 percent received partial payment, and the re5
maining 24 percent received no payment at all.
Non-custodial, incarcerated parents are an overlooked potential
source of child support payments. The prison population in the United
States is staggering (an estimated 1.6 million people in 1995).6 Using
currently available statistics, we calculate that approximately 37,820 custodial parents are owed approximately $122 million in child support by
people in prison. 7 The Child Support Recovery Act of 1992 (CSRA)
criminalizes the willful failure to pay a child support obligation when (1)
the child lives in another state, (2) the obligation has not been paid for
more than a year, and (3) the amount owed is more than $5,000. 8 Since

interstate cases-cases where the noncustodial parent lives in a different
state from his or her child(ren)-comprise a third of all non-payment
cases, 9 a large number of nonpaying parents are criminally liable under
5 See id.
6 See Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Pub. No. NCJ-161132, Prison
and Jail Inmates, 1995, at 1-2 (1996). Of these, 96 percent were serving a sentence of at least
one year. See id. at 3. In the past five years, the incarcerated population has grown by 6.7
percent per year. See id. at 2. If this trend continues, there will be 2.2 million people incarcerated by the year 2000.
7 In calculating these statistics, we make the following assumptions: (1) the percentage
of people who owe child support in prison (in the United States) is equal to the percentage of
people in the general population who owe child support (2.38%); and (2) the average amount
owed in child support by an inmate equals the average amount owed by a person in the general
populace. These two assumptions may bias the calculations, but since they pull in opposite
directions (i.e., the percentage of inmates who actually owe child support may be greater than
it is in the general U.S. population, while the average dollar amount owed by those incarcerated may actually be lower than the unincarcerated's average) we conclude that these figures
are good indications of the magnitude of the issue. The formulas used are as follows:
1) The percentage of incarcerated persons in the United States is determined by the
following formula:
# of inmates
# of adults in the U.S.
Therefore:
1,600,000
61%
261,600,000
2) The amount of child support in the United States is $20 billion. See supra note I
and accompanying text.
Therefore, the amount of child support owed by inmates is estimated to be:
$20 billion x .61%

=

$122 million.

3) The number of custodial parents who are owed child support in the United States
is 6,200,000. See BUREAU OF THE CENsus, supra note 2, at 5-6.
Therefore, the number of custodial parents who are owed child support by inmates is:
6,200,000 x .61% = 37,820.
8 Child Support Recovery Act of 1992, 18 U.S.C. § 228 (Supp. IV 1992).
9 See id.

1998]

CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATIONS

the CSRA. Since many of these non-paying parents are incarcerated,
theoretically, the number of inmates affected by the Act is also
immense.10
A non-custodial, incarcerated parent's obligation to pay child support, when he or she has been incarcerated for a crime other than nonpayment, varies from State to state. As will be shown below, some states
excuse payment because the parent in prison is determined to have had a
material change in circumstances.' Other states, however, find that such
a change in circumstances has been brought on by the parent's own illegal conduct, and therefore find it contrary to public policy to forgive
support obligations.' 2 This article describes the different approaches
taken by the various state courts which have examined this issue. We
demonstrate that there is no cohesive policy. The absence of a cohesive
policy creates inequitable inconsistencies, rendering the law vague, unwieldy, and impracticable. We argue that when balancing the rights of
convicted criminals against children who require support regardless of
parental circumstances, the welfare of children must take precedence.
We propose that state and federal governments work together to develop
and implement a uniform system of determining the obligations of incarcerated parents with respect to support payments and their collection.
I.

COURT DECISIONS

There is no federal case law that addresses the issue of child support
when the payor is incarcerated for offenses other than contempt for nonpayment of support orders; divorce laws and prisons are under the purview of the states. 13 Even though state cases often refer to other states'
laws and rulings, either for support or in distinguishing the court's rea14
soning, one thing is clear: this is not a settled area of law.
10 See supra note 7.
11 See infra Part I.A.

12 See infra Part I.C. & Part II.
13 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. X. Of course, this presumption excludes divorce cases
that are in bankruptcy and fails to acknowledge the purview of federal prisons. The basic
premise is valid, however, since the states have jurisdiction over family law matters.
14 The five states with the largest state prison populations in 1995 were California
(135,646), Texas (127,766), New York (68,484), Florida (63,879) and Ohio (44,677). See
BuREAu OF JusncE STATSTICS, supra note 6, at 5. Policies regarding collection of child

support from prisoners and their obligations are not expressly addressed in California and
Texas. New York leaves decisions regarding such obligations to the court's discretion. See
N.Y. FaM. CT. Acr § 411 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1983-1997). While not specifically addressing child support obligations, New York will not release a parent's duty of contact with
his or her child and has determined that incarceration of a parent is not a defense to a finding
of abandonment; if a child is abandoned, parental rights can be terminated. NY Soc. SERV.
LAw § 384-b (McKinney 1992). Florida also leaves these decisions to the court's discretion.

Florida's annotated statute, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.08 (West 1997), cites a case holding that the
trial court did not err in denying a husband's request to have his duty to pay child support
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We divide the analyses of state courts into three categories. First,
when determining whether an order for child support payment should be
modified, state courts consider whether the incarcerated parent's ability
to pay has been altered by a change in circumstances. 15 Most states have
divorce laws and statutes which allow for changes in support arrangements when the paying parent experiences a change of circumstances.
When analyzing whether a change of circumstances has occurred, state
courts take into account the significance, definition, duration, and cir16
cumstances of the change.
Second, state courts take into account the incarcerated parent's assets, or lack thereof, when determining the parent's ability to pay.17 In
this regard, courts have taken into account prior assets accrued from income, current assets from equity in property and pension, income from
prison work, and sometimes, future income potential. 18 Also involved is
the issue of accrual of default payments. 19
Third, state courts consider whether incarceration was voluntary or
involuntary. Courts that find incarceration to be voluntary will often not
allow incarceration to be used as a factor in determining whether to modify a child support order. 20 Courts that find incarceration to be involuntary do not bar the use of incarceration as a factor in determining whether
or not to modify a child support order.21 However, these courts still vary
in their application of the law-some courts give more weight to the fact
that the parent is incarcerated than do others. 22
A.

CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES

Some state courts have held that incarceration alone may constitute
a change in circumstances sufficient to warrant modification of the parent's support obligation. For example, the highest court of Maryland
held, in Wills v. Jones,2 3 that "a prisoner's incarceration may constitute a
terminated during his incarceration. See Tompkins v. Tompkins, 362 So.2d 689 (Fla. Dist. Ct.

App. 1978). Ohio, on the other hand, has legislated that incarceration may be a reason for
termination of a support order. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 3109.05 (Anderson 1996). However,
courts have held in Ohio that support orders can, and should be, continued while a parent is in
prison. See, e.g., Cole v. Cole, 590 N.E.2d 862 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990).
15 See infra Part I.A.
16 See infra Part I.A.
17 See infra Part I.B.
18 See infra Part I.B.
19 See discussion infra Parts I.B, I.C, II.
20 See infra Part I.C.
21 See infra Part I.C.
22 See infra Part I.C.
23 667 A.2d 331 (Md. 1995).
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material change of circumstance if the effect on the prisoner's ability to
pay child support is sufficiently reduced due to incarceration." 24
Similarly, the Idaho Court of Appeals held in Nab v. Nab25 that "a
change of economic circumstances due to incarceration may form a valid
basis for inability to comply with a contempt order."'26 Mr. Nab had
received an eight-year indeterminate sentence for a crime unrelated to
child support.27 Nonetheless, before his incarceration, Nab had diverted
funds to his legal defense and other purposes instead of making child
support payments. 2 8 Thus, he was in contempt of court for his failure to
pay support prior to his incarceration.2 9 The court of appeals disagreed
with the .trial court, which had determined that Nab's contempt status
30
precluded him from obtaining a modification of the support obligation,
and asserted that "[i]mposing upon the incarcerated parent a continuing
support obligation, beyond his ability to pay, does not help the child. It
simply adds to an accumulating burden which falls upon the parent at a
time when he is least able to bear it .... -31
The state courts which have held that incarceration constitutes a
change in circumstances have nonetheless recognized that "if an obligor
has assets available to meet a support obligation, a different conclusion
might be reached. ' 32 Additionally, it is fairly well settled that being incarcerated should not shift the burden of proof from the movant, but that
the burden is on the party seeking to modify a support order to prove a
33
material change of circumstances.
In other states, incarceration alone, albeit a change in circumstance,
is not enough to alter a parent's obligation to pay child support. In
Thomasson v. Johnson,34 the Court of Appeals of New Mexico reasoned
that while an individual's incarceration may provide a basis in a proper
case for modifying an order for the payment of child support, such is
only a factor to be considered, and "proof of incarceration standing alone
does not demonstrate an inability to pay support.' ' 35 The court then con24

Id. at 332.

25 757 P.2d 1231 (Idaho Ct. App. 1988).
26 Id. at 1238.
27 See id. at 1233.
28 See id.
29 See id.
30

See id.

31 Id. at 1238.

Cole v. Cole, 590 N.E.2d 862, 865 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990); see also infra Part I.B.
See Nab, 757 P.2d at 1238 (holding that noncustodial father who was imprisoned for a
crime other than nonsupport was not liable for payments while incarcerated unless he had
income or assets to make such payments); Leasure v. Leasure, 549 A.2d 225, 227 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1988) (holding that child support payments may be suspended during the time of incarceration, but that the support order must be reviewed upon release).
34 903 P.2d 254 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995).
35 Id. at 256.
32
33
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sidered other factors, such as, whether the incarcerated parent possessed
assets or other sources of income which would allow payment of child
support, the length of the parent's incarceration, the best interests of the
child, the clean hands doctrine, and whether incarceration was
36
voluntary.
In Cole v. Cole, the Ohio Court of Appeals held that the modification of a child support order involves a two-step process. 37 First, the trial
court must decide whether there has been a change of circumstances, and
then, considering all of the relevant factors, it can determine with "con38
siderable discretion" whether a child support order should be modified.
In Voecks v. Voecks, 39 the Court of Appeals of Wisconsin concluded that
"[incarceration] is a change in circumstances that gives a trial court competence to review a child support order," and the court may consider
incarceration as a factor when determining whether it should modify a
parent's child support obligation. 4°
In Voecks, Cheryl Voecks had appealed an order reducing her exhusband's child support obligation from $55 per week to $25 per month,
based on a decrease in William Voecks's income due to his incarceration. 4 1 William had been convicted of being a party to cocaine delivery
42
and was sentenced to seven years at a federal correctional institution.
The appellate court took into account the trial court's finding that William had undergone a dramatic reduction in income resulting from the
closing of his business operation, and his incarceration. 43 Furthermore,
the appellate court noted that William was in debt and had a limited
earning capacity; Cheryl was in a reasonable economic condition; and
William's daughter would reach the age of majority before his release
from prison.44 The court of appeals found the circumstances proper to
grant a reduction in William's child support obligation and affirmed the
45
trial court's order.
Also holding that a modification order requires consideration of a
46
variety of factors, the Supreme Court of Nebraska in Ohler v. Ohler
took into account the obligated parent's financial means, the needs of the
36 See id. at 256-57.
37 590 N.E.2d 862, 864 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990).
38 See id. The trial court determined that incarceration did not satisfy the change of
circumstances requirement in the two-step process because the change was due to the willful
act of the incarcerated parent. See id.
39 491 N.W.2d 107 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992).
40 Id. at 109.
41 Id. at 108.
42 See id
43 See id. at 110.
44 See id.

45 See id.
46 369 N.W.2d 615 (Neb. 1985).

1998]

CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATIONS

child, the good or bad faith motive of the obligated parent in sustaining a
reduction of means, and the permanence of the change.4 7 In that case,
the appellant-Ohler's application for a modification order alleged a material change in his circumstances in that he had been sentenced to fifteen
years in prison and was "'totally devoid of any funds, savings, stocks,
bonds or any other liquidable [sic] or salable assets either real or personal.'- 48 Ohler was unemployed and did not have wages, other earn49
ings, or income from any source available to him.
Regardless, the court rejected Ohler's petition, finding that he had
no cause of action. 50 While the court conceded that there is no question
but that incarceration constitutes an alteration and passage from one condition to another, it stated the issue as "whether the altered condition is
such as to warrant a suspension, [or] a temporary termination, of one's
child support obligation." 5' The court noted that "'[a]lthough unemployment or diminution of earnings is a common ground for modification, a
petition for modification will be denied if the change in financial condition is due to fault or voluntary wastage or dissipation of one's talents
and assets.' - 52 Accordingly, the court declined to suspend Ohler's child
53
support obligation.
After finding a change in circumstances, most courts consider the
degree of "permanence" to the change in order to determine whether that
change in circumstances substantially affects the parent's ability to pay
support. While some states require a parent to show that a change is
"permanent" in order to claim a "change in circumstances," there is no
consensus as to what constitutes "permanence" for purposes of warranting a modification order. In 1980, an Idaho case, Fullerv. Fuller,54 reiterated the standard that "a modification of child support payments can be
made only where there is shown to be a material, permanent, and sub'55
stantial change in conditions and circumstances.
Nonetheless, in Nab, the Idaho Court of Appeals, while acknowledging Fuller,noted that no other Idaho cases or statutes mention permanence as a requirement for modification. 56 For example, section 32-709
of the Idaho Code, which addresses the modification of support proviSee id. at 616-17 (citing Morisch v. Morisch, 355 N.W.2d 784 (Neb. 1984)).
Id. at 616 (quoting appellant-Ohler's application).
49 See id.
50 See id at 616, 618.
51 Id. at 617.
52 Id. (quoting Noddin v. Noddin, 455 A.2d 1051, 1053 (N.H. 1983)); see also infra Part
I.C. (discussing further the issue of "fault," or "voluntariness").
53 See Ohler, 369 N.W.2d at 618.
54 607 P.2d 1314 (Idaho 1980) (increasing a non-incarcerated father's child support payments when he went from working part-time to full-time).
55 Id. at 317.
56 Nab v. Nab, 757 P.2d 1231, 1238 (Idaho App. 1988).
47
48
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sions in divorce decrees, states that modification can be made only upon
a "showing of a substantial and material change of circumstances. ' 57
The Nab court cited that statute and noted that in it there was no mention
of "permanent.15 8 Thus, the court held:
[a]lthough we are not inclined to construe I.C. § 32-709
as nullifying the rule that a change in circumstances
must be "permanent" to justify a modification, neither
are we prepared to hold that incarceration and the associated possibility of reduction in income for an extended,
but nonetheless limited, period is insufficient in permanence for a court to modify the amount of support required. Instead, we believe the period for which a
change in circumstances is anticipated to exist, and its
permanence, should be two of the factors to be considered by the trial court in determining whether a change
'59
in circumstances is "substantial.
The court in Nab therefore concluded that "Nab's motion [to modify]
should not be denied merely because Nab [would most likely] not be
'60
incarcerated for the remainder of his life."
In In re Marriage of Vetternack,61 where the issue was whether an
order for child support payments should have been modified because the
father became incarcerated for a felony, the Iowa Supreme Court expounded the principles that:
(1) there must be a substantial and material change in the
circumstances occurring after the entry of the decree; (2)
not every change in circumstances is sufficient; (3) it
must appear that continued enforcement of the original
decree would, as a result of the changed conditions, result in positive wrong or injustice; (4) the change in circumstances must be permanent or continuous rather than
temporary; (5) the change in financial conditions must
be substantial; and (6) the change in circumstances must
not have been within the contemplation of the trial court
62
when the original decree was entered.
57 IDAHO CODE § 32-709 (1997).
58 Nab, 757 P.2d at 1239.
59 Id.

60 Id. The father in Nab was incarcerated for eight years for a criminal offense unrelated
to the payment of child support.
61 334 N.W.2d 761 (Iowa 1983).
62 Id. at 762 (emphasis added).
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A court in Pennsylvania, in Leasure v. Leasure,63 chose to compare
the concept of permanence to the situation in which a parent loses a
job.64 When a parent loses a job, his "change in circumstances" is indefinite in that he may secure employment within a very short time or he
may be out of work for several years. 65 Similarly, the incarcerated parent in Leasure was sentenced to serve one or two years in prison; though
he could have only served nine months with pre-release, it was also possible that he could serve the entire two-year period. 66 Thus, the court
allowed for a modification order and refused to deny the order; the court
did not want to base a denial of an order on the fact that the parent would
not be incarcerated forever.67
Thus, there is a loose consensus that incarceration is akin to a permanent change. This is perhaps a reason why courts, usually, will not
per se reject incarceration as a possible factor to consider for a modification order. In fact, as indicated above, some courts have allowed incarceration to be used as the sole factor for instituting the modification
proceeding. However, one could argue that imprisonment with possibility of parole is actually no more permanent than employment at will,
where the employee could be laid off or fired, could quit, or could be
injured at any time.
B.

ASSETS

Another consideration in determining ability to pay is the incarcerated parent's assets, or lack thereof. As will be shown, some states take
a narrow view of what constitutes "having assets," while other states
interpret the term broadly. In 1981, a court of appeals in Oregon held
that "[i]mprisonment and resulting indigency constitute a significant
change of circumstances such as to permit a court to modify a support
obligation," 68 and that a parent should "not [be] liable for such payments
while incarcerated unless it is affirmatively shown that he or she has
69
income or assets to make such payments.1
This Oregon case, In re Marriage of Edmonds, was overruled in
70
1991 by Oregon ex rel. Willis v. Willis (In re Marriage of Willis).
63 549 A.2d 225 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
64 See id. at 227.
65 See id.
66 See id.
67 See id.
68 In re Marriage of Edmonds, 633 P.2d 4, 5 (Or. Ct. App. 1981), overruledby 820 P.2d
858 (Or. Ct. App. 1991), rev'd, 840 P.2d 697 (Or. 1992).
69 Id.at 5.
70 820 P.2d 858 (Or. Ct. App. 1991), rev'd, 840 P.2d 697 (Or. 1992) [hereinafter Willis
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However, in 1992, Willis I was reversed. 7 1 Thus, the current state of the
law in Oregon follows Willis II, which held that even though incarceration alone does not demonstrate inability to meet an existing child support obligation, if a parent's remaining assets are insufficient to meet his
support obligations during his incarceration, a substantial change of circumstances can be found and the parent's child support obligation may
72
be modified.
An incarcerated parent's liability for child support also depends on
the jurisdiction's determination of whether assets other than income can
be used for the support. In L.C.S. v. S.A.S., 73 a Virginia court did not
need to decide the issue of whether an incarcerated parent is "voluntarily
unemployed" due to incarceration, because the known resources of the
payor parent provided an alternate means of computing an award. 74 In
this case, the incarcerated father had $500,000 worth of financial resources to produce the income necessary to meet his support obligations. 75 The Virginia court used guidelines found in the Virginia Code
that establish a rebuttable presumption where child support is calculated
as a percentage of the parents' combined gross monthly income. 76 The
court also relied on the section 20-108.1(B)(11) of the Code, which lists
the factors to be considered as the "[e]arning capacity, obligations and
needs and financial resources of each parent" and "[i]mputed income to a
' 77
party who is voluntarily unemployed or under employed.
The court also said that in determining the ability of a parent to pay
support, a court must consider "any assets owned by the.., parent and
'actual earnings and . . . capacity to earn, whether from ... personal
exertions or... property.'- 78 The court held that the financial resources
of a parent, whether incarcerated or not, include the value of any assets
and any potential income from those assets. 79 The court further found
that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to deviate from the
presumptive amount of support from income, and by not considering the
husband's financial resources and the potential income from other
80
resources.
71 See Oregon ex rel. Willis v. Willis (In re Marriage of Willis), 840 P.2d 697 (Or. 1992)
[hereinafter Willis 11].
72 See id. at 699.
73 453 S.E.2d 580 (Va. Ct. App. 1995).
74 Id. at 585.
75 See id. at 584.
76 See id.

at 585 (citing

VA. CODE ANN.

§ 20-108.2 (Michie 1995)).

77 Id.
78

Id. (quoting Robertson v. Robertson, 211 S.E.2d 41, 44 (Va. 1975)).

79 See id.
80 See id.
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Another Virginia case, Donnell v. Donnell,8 1 agreed that when making an award based on income, the trial court is authorized to consider
earning capacity as well as actual income, but further stated that "the
award must be based upon circumstances as they exist at the time of the
award."'82 In that case, the husband retired from his position with the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in "anticipation of a jail sentence"
(imposed because the father coerced sexual acts against the parties'
daughters-one as young as four).83 Since "circumstances that led to the
dissolution of the marriage [did not need to be considered, having] had
no effect upon marital property, its value, or otherwise," 84 the court reasoned that despite the fact that the "husband's misconduct ... may have
contributed to his reduction in income by forcing his retirement," the
husband did not retire to avoid any support obligation, and he at least
85
guaranteed his pension by retiring.
The court also held that basing income on uncertain future circumstance is not permitted. 86 In coming to this holding, the court cited a
1987 Virginia case, which found that in divorce cases, while the court is
authorized to consider not only earnings but also earning capacity, "the
award must be based upon the circumstances in existence at the time of
the award. An award 'premised upon the occurrence of an uncertain future circumstance... ignores the design and defeats the purpose of the
statutory scheme."' 87 This holding was followed in L.C.S. v. S.A.S.
where, although known resources were used to compute a child support
award, the court held that since the husband was barred from the practice
of. law due to the loss of his license, his "former employment [was] a
legal impossibility, and any imputation of income based on that would be
'88
speculative.
People arguing both sides of the issue-those arguing that support
obligations should be suspended until after incarceration has ended, and
those arguing that any assets from which payments can be made should
be used to make support payments-have relied upon the Oregon rule
that the court should suspend the incarcerated father's support obligation
if there is an absence of any other income or assets from which to make
payments. 89 The Court of Appeals of Michigan, for example, held that
81 455 S.E.2d 256 (Va. Ct. App. 1995).
82 Id. at 258.
83 Id. at 257.
84 Id. at 258 (citing Aster v. Gross, 371 S.E.2d 833, 836 (Va. Ct. App. 1988)).
85 Id. at 258.
86 See id.
87 Payne v. Payne, 363 S.E.2d 428, 430 (Va. Ct. App. 1987) (quoting Jacobs v. Jacobs,
254 S.E.2d 56, 58 (Va. 1979)).
88 L.C.S. v. S.A.S., 453 S.E.2d 580, 585 (Va. Ct. App. 1995).
89 See In re Marriage of Edmonds, 633 P.2d 4, 5 (Or. Ct. App. 1981), overruled by 820
P.2d 858 (Or. Ct. App. 1991), rev'd, 840 P.2d 697 (Or. 1992). Note that Willis II also ordered
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"where a noncustodial parent is imprisoned for a crime other than nonsupport that parent is not liable for child support while incarcerated unless it is affirmatively shown that [the parent] has income or assets to
make such payments." 90
A court in New York similarly found that a father imprisoned for a
crime other than nonsupport was not liable for child support payments
while incarcerated unless it could be affirmatively shown that the father
had income or assets to make the payments. 9 1 Special Term had declined to reduce completely the father's support obligations, finding that
the father had an asset since he owned a half-interest in the marital premises. 92 However, the supreme court, appellate division, reversed and
stated, "'a release of the husband's equity in a house which is being used
as a residence by the wife, and is probably not going to be sold, is an
inappropriate and unsatisfactory way to provide for the support of a child
which obviously requires current cash."93 The court added that more
concern should be with liquid assets, "unless there is some indication,
not present [in this case] that the parent is deliberately holding down his
'94
earning capability.
Some states are less timid about considering equity. For instance,
the Iowa Supreme Court held, in its first appeal presenting the claim that
a support order should be modified because of incarceration, that courts
should take into consideration each parent's earning capacity, economic
circumstances and cost of living, and that "the petitioner's equity in the
house should be charged for the support payments he is unable to meet
during the period of his incarceration. ' 95 The Supreme Court of Delaware similarly held that a father should be required to liquidate his assets
in order to discharge his child support obligation. 96 The court reasoned
that "[i]n the event that a parent becomes incarcerated, children continue
to need support. It would be inequitable to have the support obligation
discharged by one parent, or society, while the incarcerated parent retains
'97
available assets."
Likewise, section 30-3-5 of the Utah Code Annotated gives the trial
court broad equitable power to order the payment of child support.9 8 In
a modification of the father's child support obligation, primarily because the father's remaining assets were insufficient to enable him to meet his support obligations. 840 P.2d at 699.
90 Pierce v. Pierce, 412 N.W.2d 291, 292 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987).
91 See Foster v. Foster, 471 N.Y.S.2d 867, 868 (App. Div. 1984).
92 See id. at 868.
93 Id. at 869 (quoting Lea v. Lea, 399 N.Y.S.2d 219, 221 (App. Div. 1977)).
94 Id.

95 In re Marriage of Vetternack, 334 N.W.2d 761, 763 (Iowa 1983).
96 See Harper v. Barrows, 570 A.2d 1180, 1185 (Del. 1990).
97 Id. at 1184.

98 UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5 (1987).
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Proctorv. Proctor,99 the trial court was therefore not required to exercise
its equitable powers to protect the incarcerated's assets from his children,
since his "inability to provide for his children from an income.., was a
direct consequence of his own misconduct."'' 0 The court of appeals also
found "no Utah authority equating .

.

. the 'ability to earn' with only

actual income or earnings,"'' 1 but rather stated that the "trial court appropriately took into account the home equity awarded to [the incarcerated father] and his lack of living expenses during incarceration as
factors relevant to determining the amount of prospective child
02
support."l
Whether an inmate's incentive pay should be subject to child support obligations is another issue of interest. One case is directly on point,
and despite an aggressive dissent, the court answered in the affirmative.10 3 The case involved an incarcerated father who was sentenced to
life imprisonment for attempted first degree murder; he shot his ex-wife
in front of one of their children.' 0 4 The father then petitioned for a modification of his child support order on the basis that his life sentence constituted a change in circumstance.' 0 5 The court did enter a reduction, but
still ordered that ongoing payments of child support were to be paid out
of the state penitentiary's incentive pay program; the incarcerated father
appealed.' 0 6 The father argued that his monthly personal expenses for
items not provided by the state penitentiary met or exceeded his monthly
income, so he had nothing left with which to pay child support. 10 7
The appellant contended that he should not have had to pay anything since "the order in which the items [were] listed establishe[d] their
priority," and "therefore... child support obligations are a lower priority
than personal necessities .... 10 8 Appellant argued that "an incarcerated
parent is not liable for child support unless it can be shown that he has
income or assets sufficient to make the payments."' 0 9 However, the
Glenn court pointed out that the father did have the ability to pay something since he was receiving incentive pay. 110
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107

773 P.2d 1389 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Id. at 1391.
Id. at 1390.
Id at 1390-91.

See Glenn v. Glenn, 848 P.2d 819, 821-22 (Wyo. 1993).
See id. at 820.
See id.
See id. at 821.

See id. at 820. The incentive pay program is authorized by Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 7-16203 (Michie 1997), which allows a person in confinement to receive compensation which is to
be used for personal necessities, victim compensation, support of dependents, reimbursement
for the services of a public defender or a court appointed lawyer. See Glenn, 848 P.2d at 821.
108 Glenn, 848 P.2d 819 at 821.
109 Id. at 822.
110 Id.
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The court acknowledged that many courts follow the old Alaska
approach, 11 ' that the incarcerated parent does not have to pay child support during his incarceration if he does not have an income.' 12 However,
the court decided to follow the rule announced in Pierce, that if the incarcerated parent does have assets or income while in prison, that income3
can properly be applied against the outstanding support obligation."1
The court, therefore, ruled that when an incarcerated parent has income,
14
that income can fairly be applied to the child support obligation."
The new law in Alaska requires that noncustodial parents meet a
minimum support obligation regardless of their inability to pay.' 1 5 As
interpreted by the Supreme Court of Alaska, it does not matter if the
parent is incarcerated and has "an income of less than the poverty level
or no income at all. 11 6 Even though Douglas had no means of income,
had no assets, did not receive a permanent fund dividend, and was not
personally eligible for public assistance payments, she was required to
pay at least the legal minimum of $50 per month.' 17 The court reasoned
that indigent incarcerated parents should not be treated differently from
other indigent parents who are also subject to the rule. 118 Thus, in Douglas's circumstances, her debt would most likely accrue as would any
other debts she owed. 119 The court said that Douglas would be able to
satisfy the debt "upon her release from prison and reentry into the120work
force, or upon any improvement in her financial circumstances."'
C.

VOLUNTARR

ESS

One factor that weighs against modification of a support order is the
voluntariness of the incarceration, or the fault of the incarcerated parent
in bringing on the change in circumstance. The effect given to the voluntariness aspect of incarceration differs among states, and seems to revolve around subjective views and semantics. One view is that people
should be responsible for their own actions, and that those who are incar"II See, e.g., Clemans v. Collins, 679 P.2d 1041 (Alaska 1984). Note, however, that Civil
Rule 90 superseded Clemans. See Douglas v. Alaska Dep't of Corrections, 880 P.2d 113, 116
(Alaska 1994). In Douglas, the Alaska Supreme Court interpreted Civil Rule 90.3 as subjecting incarcerated parents to the same child support obligations as those not in prison. See id.
See generally ALAsKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 15, § 125.010 (1987) (adopting Civil Rule 90.3 as the
child support guidelines for the Alaska Department of Revenue).
112 See Glenn, 848 P.2d at 822.
113 See id. (citing Pierce v. Pierce, 412 N.W.2d 291, 292-93 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987)).
114 See id. at 822-23.
115 See Douglas, 880 P.2d at 115 (interpreting Alaska Civil Rule 90.3).

116 Id.

117 See id. at 116-17.
118 See id. at 116.
119 See id.
120 Id.

19981

CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATIONS

cerated are imprisoned as a result of illegal actions they voluntarily
12
performed. '
For example, in 1983, the Supreme Court of Iowa heard its "first
appeal presenting the claim that a support order should be modified because of the incarceration of the parent ordered to pay."' 122 In Vetternack, where it was alleged that petitioner "fired a firearm" through the
window of his ex-wife's home while she and their children were at
home, 123 the husband wanted his child payment responsibilities modified
because of his alleged change in circumstances. 124 In reasoning why the
request for modification would be denied, the court noted a trend: "any
voluntariness in diminished earning capacity has become increasingly an
impediment to modification."' 125 Like the Vetternack court, other state
courts which have held that incarceration is not a change of circumstance
requiring suspension or termination of a support order have emphasized
126
the willful nature of the conduct that led to incarceration.
One might ask how a plaintiff could assert that his incarceration was
forced upon him, and was hence involuntary, when he voluntarily undertook an action that would almost certainly lead to incarceration. Yet,
some courts reason that where incarceration was not due to some act that
was intended to relieve the defendant from child support obligations, the
incarceration cannot be deemed voluntary. 127 In Oregon, for example, an
incarcerated parent would only be foreclosed from demonstrating a
change in circumstances due to a reduction of his or her financial status
if the crime committed was for the primary purpose of avoiding his or
128
her support obligation.
Part of that view likely stems from a presumption that no one normally volunteers to be incarcerated; most people vehemently oppose the
idea and fight hard in their own defense to avoid such a sentence. In this
regard, contrast the Supreme Court of Nebraska's holding in Ohler with
the law of Idaho in Nab. In Ohler, the court said that the defendant was
engaged in criminal activity and his reduced financial ability was due to
his own fault. 12 9 The rationale behind the holding in Nab, however, was
that "[tihe incarceration of the contemnor [was] not a voluntary or bad

122

See, e.g., infra notes 123-26 and accompanying text.
In re Marriage of Vetternack, 334 N.W.2d 761, 762 (Iowa 1983).

123

Id. at 761-62.

124

See id. at 761.
Id. at 763.

121

125

126 See supra notes 34-36, 50-53 and accompanying text; infra note 134 and accompanying text.

127
128
129

See infra notes 128, 130-32 and accompanying text.
See Willis I1,
840 P.2d 697, 698-99 (Or. 1992).
Ohler v. Ohler, 369 N.W.2d 615, 617 (Neb. 1985).
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faith change in circumstances in the sense that the contemnor's act [was]
1 30
self-disabling."
Such contrasting views on the issue of voluntariness are representative of how the states differ in their policies regarding child support obligations of incarcerated parents. In a case where a father was convicted
of first degree manslaughter and was sentenced to a term of five to fifteen years, a New York appellate court found that the defendant's default
in child support payments due to incarceration was not willful, and therefore his support obligation could be retroactively reduced.13 1 The court
ruled that the obligation to pay child support would be suspended until
13 2
the date he was released from prison.
However, since the New York State legislature has not specifically
made policy concerning child support obligations of prisoners, it is possible for a contrasting view to be upheld in a different appellate court (or
department) of the state. Thus, without overturning the Foster decision,
the New York Court of Appeals in Knights v. Knights133 upheld a nearly
contrary decision of a lower court in- a different department. The New
York Court of Appeals stated:
it is undisputed that petitioner's current financial hardship is solely the result of his wrongful conduct culminating in a felony conviction and imprisonment. Thus, it
cannot be said that Family Court abused its discretion in
determining that these "changed financial circumstances" warranted neither a reduction of petitioner's
child support obligation nor a suspension in the accrual
of the support payments during the period of petitioner's
34
incarceration.1
Courts also debate whether the loss of income due to being incarcerated is more like a person's inability to work because of a disability, or
whether it is more akin to a person's quitting a job. In In re Marriageof
Blickenstaff,135 since the statute did not define "voluntary unemployment," the court relied on the dictionary and concluded that the term
should be defined as "unemployment ...

brought about by one's own

free choice and is intentional rather than accidental."' 136 With this definition, the court held that an incarcerated parent is not "voluntarily unemNab v. Nab, 757 P.2d 1231, 1238 (Idaho Ct. App. 1988).
Foster v. Foster, 471 N.Y.S.2d 867, 869 (App. Div. 1984).
132 See id. at 869.
133 522 N.E.2d 1045 (N.Y. 1988).
134 Id. at 1046.
135 859 P.2d 646 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993).
136 Id. at 648 (relying on WEBSTER'S NEw WORLD DICIONARY 1592 (2nd College ed.
130
131

1976)).
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ployed" within the meaning of the child support statutes unless the parent
137
was imprisoned for a crime of nonsupport or for failure to pay support.
Since the court found the incarceration to be involuntary, the trial court
could have properly considered the father's lack of income due to his
imprisonment when deciding whether to grant his modification petition. 138 Also rejecting an analogy of incarceration to a voluntary decrease in income, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania found incarceration
39
to be involuntary.'
Nonetheless, other courts have concluded that lack of -work income
due to incarceration does not eliminate the duty to provide for children
pursuant to support orders. For example, in Utah, where a father was
convicted of raping a child and given a minimum mandatory sentence of
five years in prison, the court held that "an able bodied person who stops
working, as an exercise of personal preference or as a result of punishment for an intentional criminal act, nonetheless retains the ability to
earn and the duty to support his or her children."' 40 In Ohio, a court held
that "the accrual of a child support obligation while incarcerated as a
result of a voluntary act is no more discriminatory than imposing that
41
same obligation on one who is voluntarily unemployed."'
Another area where the law has seen some shifts is in the application of the "clean hands doctrine" as applied to application for equitable
relief from child support requirements. The clean hands doctrine is premised on the reasoning that one seeking equitable relief cannot take advantage of one's own wrongdoings. 142 In Willis II, the Oregon Supreme
Court held that the equitable doctrine of "unclean hands" does not bar an
incarcerated parent from seeking a modification of child support if the
parent's reduction in income due to incarceration was not taken for the
primary purpose of avoiding the support obligation. 43 However, for a
brief period of time, Oregon used the "clean hands" doctrine: "if an obligor, acting in bad faith, voluntarily worsen[ed] his financial position so
that he [could] not meet his obligations, he [could] not obtain a modification of support." 144 The court reasoned that "the incarcerated parent has
control over his actions and should be held to the consequences,"' 4 5 and
that the parent "should not be able to escape his financial obligation to
137
138

Id. at 650-51.

See id. at 651.

139 See Leasure v. Leasure, 549 A.2d 225, 227 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
140

Proctor v. Proctor, 773 P.2d 1389, 1391 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

141 Cole v. Cole, 590 N.E.2d 862, 866 (Ohio Ct App. 1990).
142 See Fair Automotive Repair, Inc. v. Car-X Service Systems, Inc., 471 N.E.2d 554, 558
(M. 1984).
143 See Willis II, 840 P.2d 697 (Or. 1992), rev'g, 820 P.2d 858 (Or. Ct. App. 1991).
144 Willis 1, 820 P.2do858, 859 (Or. Ct. App. 1991), rev'd, 840 P.2d 697 (Or. 1992).
145 IM2at 860.
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his children simply because his misdeeds have placed him behind
bars."' 4 6

Willis I brought Oregon back to its pre-Willis I precedent, that an
incarcerated and obligated parent with no income should not be required
to pay child support until he is capable of gainful employment. 147 Today
the law in Oregon is that even if a "father's own misconduct has resulted
in his imprisonment," application of the clean hands doctrine would be
improper "in the absence of some showing that he became imprisoned in
14 8
order to avoid his support obligation."'
Contrast the Oregon law with the Nebraska Supreme Court's decision in Ohler, which held:
Incarceration of the applicant necessarily means that he
was found to have violated a criminal statute. Where
one seeks relief from the obligation to pay child support
on the basis that he or she is incarcerated, the violation
of the statute which resulted in the incarceration is directly connected with the matter of child support. Under
those circumstances equity should not and will not act to
149
give relief.
II.

PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES

Equally undetermined are the states' conclusions on issues of public
policy. Of course, several different and, at times, competing rights must
be considered. One public policy aspect that has some consensus is the
idea that one should not reap a benefit from committing a crime. Under
this theory, the Utah Court of Appeals in Proctorfound that "in light of
the latitude given the trial court to provide for the children's needs in an
equitable manner, [there was] no abuse of discretion and no impermissible extra penalty on appellant in the court's order [that child support
payments can be charged against appellant's equity interest in the marital
home]."' 5 0
However, the Supreme Court of Oregon held that the test was
whether the reduction in income was self-imposed or in bad faith; absent
a showing that incarceration was a result of a parent's deliberate attempt
to avoid child support obligations, an order of modification may be appropriate. 15 1 The court noted that "incarceration alone does not demon146 Id.

147 See In re Marriage of Edmonds, 633 P.2d 4,5-6 (Or. Ct. App. 1981), overruledby 820
P.2d 859 (Or. Ct. App. 1991), rev'd, 840 P.2d 697 (Or. 1992).
148 Id. at 6; see Willis II, 840 P.2d at 699.
149 Ohler v. Ohler, 369 N.W.2d 615, 618 (Neb. 1985).
150 Proctor v. Proctor, 773 P.2d 1389, 1391 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
151 See Willis II, 840 P.2d at 699.
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strate inability to meet an existing child support obligation," and found
152
that every motion must be considered on a case-by-case basis.
The policy against reaping benefit from a crime is balanced against
the policy that a person should not be punished twice for the same crime.
In this regard, there is debate over whether or not there should be accrual
of the incarcerated parent's child support obligations that are not paid. In
1985, the Nebraska court stated that there is no reason why those "who
have had to step in and assume the applicant's obligations should not be
reimbursed by the applicant should his future position enable him to do
so.' u 5 3 Yet in Michigan in 1987, a court came to the conclusion that "a
noncustodial parent's support arrearage which accrued while the parent
was imprisoned should be discharged unless there is some showing that
the parent became incarcerated in order to avoid his support
obligation."'

154

The strongest voice against allowing accrual of child support is
found in Judge Krivosha's dissent in Ohler, where he reasoned that even
though "the parent against whom the judgment runs has been convicted
of violating a law and has brought the problem into being by reason of
his own act," the accrual is an imposition of an additional penalty and is
not appropriate since the State addressed the violation, and the individual
is now paying the penalty. 155 Judge Krivosha's dissent also points out
that "the pressures of paying a child support judgment," in many cases
long after the child has grown, does "little, if anything, to assist in reha15 6
bilitating the prisoner."
Courts in other jurisdictions have cited the dissent in Ohler. For
instance, the Idaho court deciding Nab held that barring an incarcerated
and indigent parent from seeking a modification due to past contempt
provides no present benefit to the child, and only overburdens the parent. 157 Yet, the Supreme Court of Iowa pointed out that "the crucial
thing is that, during petitioner's incarceration, it will continue to be necessary to care, feed, and provide for his children. He remains responsible
for those expenses."' 58 Additionally, the court in Ohler-which stands
as good law-stated that it could not "see how the best interests of the
children for whom the support was ordered would be served by tempo15 9
rarily terminating the applicant's child support obligation."'
Id.
Ohler, 369 N.W.2d at 618.
154 Pierce v. Pierce, 412 N.W.2d 291, 293 (Mich Ct. App. 1987).
155 Ohler, 369 N.W.2d at 619 (Krishova, J., dissenting).
156 Id.
157 Nab v. Nab, 757 P.2d 1231, 1238 (Idaho Ct. App. 1988); see also text accompanying
supra note 31.
158 In re Marriage of Vetternack, 334 N.W.2d 761, 763 (Iowa 1983).
159 Ohler, 369 N.W.2d at 618.
152
153
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PROPOSALS AND CONCLUSION
Since the law of the states is not cohesive and settled, it is vital that
courts carefully reflect on the policy behind their proclamations. We are
in agreement with the rationale of the courts which hold that where assets
exist, those assets should be prioritized towards the payment of child
support. First, this rationale makes for sound policy and fiscal sense.
Such a policy would relieve the various state and federal government
agencies of the undue burden of caring for those children who are not
being adequately supported by their incarcerated parents. Second, a uniform rule would prevent expectations and obligations from being in a
state of flux among jurisdictions.
One way of addressing the problem is to analyze who is inconvenienced by the policy choice that determines whether non-custodial incarcerated parents should be required to continue to pay child support or
pay the accrued child support upon release from prison. In most situations, the children would be at greater risk of harm if the incarcerated
parents were not required to pay than would be the incarcerated parents if
they were required to pay. It is axiomatic that a person should be held
responsible for his or her actions. Incarcerated parents first took the responsibility of becoming parents, and then, by their own actions acted in
such a way that resulted in their incarceration. By virtue of their illegal
actions, they should not be relieved of all responsibilities to their children. When people are incarcerated, they are not relieved of their other
financial responsibilities, such as making car payments. 160 A child
should be afforded at least the same legal status.
A reasonable response to the question of whether a non-custodial
incarcerated parent has a continuing obligation to pay child support
would be to fashion the law so that if an incarcerated parent has the
ability to pay-either from savings, salary, pension, or other assets-that
parent should pay. Incarcerated parents are no longer financially responsible for their own food, clothing and shelter, and therefore may have
assets that no longer need to be reserved to provide for their own basic
needs. These assets should be used to meet the needs of their children,
for whom their responsibility does not end.
The courts and legislatures should be compelled to recognize that
the needs of children are not in any way lessened when an obligor is
imprisoned. Children still require money to cover their basic needs such
as food, clothing, shelter, childcare, and education. Millions of dollars
owed by incarcerated parents are still needed to support these children.
It is common sense and sound policy to require an incarcerated parent to
meet any child support obligations to whatever extent possible.
160 See, e.g., Douglas v. Alaska Dep't of Corrections, 880 P.2d 113, 116 (Alaska 1994).
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When the imprisoned obligor is unable to pay while in prison, the
state and welfare system often come to the aid of the obligor's children.
However, the state should not be viewed as providing relief to the incarcerated parent; rather, it should be viewed as supporting the child temporarily while the obligor is unable to do so. Additionally, assuming the
incarcerated parent completes the sentence or is released, the obligor
should be required to reimburse the state as he or she is able.
A prison sentence is often referred to as payment for a debt to society. However, a prisoner's debt is hardly being paid if the prisoner is
simultaneously incurring another debt to society by failing to pay child
support obligations. Therefore, if the parent is unable to pay child support during incarceration, this "second" debt can and should be repaid
upon release.' 6 ' This is not an additional punishment or fine, but is a
simple reimbursement to the state for what the parent was obligated to
pay in the first place. Likewise, public policy considerations require that
other family members or private individuals who paid the child support
owed by the obligor during the obligor's incarceration, should be reimbursed for their expenditures. Private individuals should not be forced to
assume the responsibility and obligations of the incarcerated parent any
more than the state should.
These policies should not be terribly difficult or expensive to implement. Mechanisms already exist to track child support obligations, and
as of October 1, 1997, every state is required to have an approved automated tracking and monitoring system for child support obligations. 162
By requiring that prisoners be held responsible for child support orders,
millions of dollars from state welfare programs will be saved, and attention will properly be re-focused on the best interests of our children.
In the midst of rampant welfare reform, the commitment to bolstering child support orders has never been stronger:
For more than two decades, the Federal Government has
played a leading role in requiring States to establish and
conduct strong child support enforcement programs.
161 Accrual should only apply when there is a possibility of repayment. Often, when the
parent is sentenced to life in prison without possibility of parole, it makes no sense to have the
debt accrue, because there is no possibility that the prisoner will be able to earn enough money
to pay the state or others back. However, even when a prisoner has no assets, his or her
circumstances could change while he or she is incarcerated. For example, he or she could
become an heir to an estate or could be named a beneficiary to a trust, at which point, a new
modification order would be required to reflect this change in circumstances.
162 See Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (1988). The
original deadline for the system was October 1, 1995, but has been extended each year as the
tracking requirements have become more rigorous. See 42 U.S.C. § 653 (1994), as amended
by Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-193, 110 Stat. 2105, 2216 (1996). See generally Child Support Enforcement Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 651-69 (1994), as amended by § 344, 110 Stat. at 2234-37.
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The fundamental goal of these programs . . . is to in-

crease the financial security of children who live with
one parent. This goal enjoys nearly universal support
among members of Congress and among the American
public. 163
Nevertheless, technology has been outpacing policy. The federal and
state governments are tracking deadbeat parents, using one of the largest
164
computer databases.
It hardly needs be argued that being incarcerated results in a change
of circumstances for the person convicted. Likewise, the question of voluntariness of incarceration is largely an issue of semantics: granted no
one wants to be incarcerated, yet performing illegal activities that lead to
incarceration can be blamed on no one other than the person convicted.
We conclude that the analyses and policy implementation should be uniform, and that the monetary liability of the parents be determined by
balancing the needs of the child with the incarcerated parent's ability to
pay. The needs of children do not disappear with the convicted's cessation of liberty, determined to be just under our legal system. Freedom to
move and ability to pay are not necessarily mutually exclusive, and a
term of imprisonment should not be the determinative factor. The aim is
not to further punish an incarcerated, noncustodial parent. The aim is to
have a system that logically requires payment when it is at all feasible for
the parent to do so. Where the assets exist, they should be tapped.
Federal guidelines are necessary for several reasons. First, it is unjust to seemingly reward criminal behavior with a cessation of financial
obligations. Such a policy is unsound in the first instance, and the injustice is compounded when it is applied only to some prisoners, in some
states. Second, when support is not paid by a non-custodial incarcerated
parent, it must come from other sources. Often government agencies
pick up the burden, which means that it is in the states' best interest to
implement laws that do not encourage the payment of governmental benefits when other sources of money are available. If the incarcerated parent has the ability to pay support using liquidable assets during the
incarceration, there is no reason the government should be spending its
tax dollars. Similarly, states should keep records of amounts they paid
for a parent's support obligation if the incarcerated parent is unable to
pay while incarcerated. In the event that the parent is released from
prison and makes enough money to repay the government or other in163 H.R. REP. No. 104-651, at 1440 (1996). The reforms brought by the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996 were described by Senator Presler as "the toughest
child support laws ever passed by Congress." 142 CONG. REc. S9396 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1996).
164 See Robert Pear, Vast Worker Databaseto Track DeadbeatParents,N.Y. TIMs, Sept.
22, 1997, at Al.
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terim sources of support, it makes sense that the parent should make the
repayment. There is no intent to make non-custodial parents' lives more
difficult; we only want to ensure that they continue to meet their responsibilities. This policy should not vary from state to state, but should be
uniform across the country in the interest of justice and equity.
In order to achieve the ultimate goal of providing for the welfare of
children of incarcerated parents, state and federal governments must
work together to develop and implement a uniform system for determining support payments and their collection. In so doing, the interests of
the child, the incarcerated parent and the state are addressed, and an optimal solution is reached.
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